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Abstract
This briefing starts by analysing the reasons why the individual members 
of the euro area (EA) cannot not yet be considered to jointly constitute 
an  "optimal  currency area",  such  as  low  labour  market  mobility, 
divergences  in  competitiveness,  fiscal  position  and  inflation,  etc. 
Thereafter,  the  paper  discusses  the  current  short-comings  of  the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as an economic governance mechanism 
in light of the Greek crisis. Lastly, the paper discusses 4 possible policy 
options:
1. Letting Greece default;
2. IMF intervention or joint IMF EA intervention;
3. Creation of an "EMF"; and
4. Creation of a single issuer of Eurobonds.
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After ten years of monetary integration, the recent large recession is proving  to be  the 
most important challenge to EMU and the Euro Area (EA) in its short history. All of the 
tensions that the EA is suffering now are not new, they were warned by many economists 
many years ago as shown by de la Dehesa and Krugman (1992): 
First, the lack of a supranational or federal-like system and the need for fiscal federalism, 
shown  by  the  MacDougall  Report  (1977)  and  Sachs  and  Sala  i  Martin  (1992)  or  more 
recently by Padoa-Schioppa (2004). Second, that the EA was not an optimal currency area 
(OCA) shown by Mckinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969); that the size of the EU budget was 
too  small,  as  shown  by  Krugman  (1993),  Eichengreen  (1993)  and  Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen  (1994)  and  that  labour  mobility  was  too  low  pointed  by  Sachs  and  Sala  i 
Martin (1993). Third, that the Stability and Growth Pact (SPG) as a substitute for the lack 
of  EU  automatic  stabilizers  was  showing  many  weaknesses  and  was  too  pro-cyclical 
(Wyplosz, 2002) and fourth, that the ECB no bail-out clause was going to create problems 
in asymmetric recessions (Masson and Taylor, 1993).    
        
It  is  well  known  that  the  EA i s  not  yet  an  optimal  currency  area  according  to  the 
requirements set by Nobel Prize Robert Mundell (1961). His requirements included: high 
labour mobility and lack of physical and cultural barriers within the monetary union, high 
capital mobility and financial integration, high price and wage flexibility and above all, a 
large  federal  or  union  budget  capable  of  making  generous  transfers  to  member  states 
which  suffer  asymmetric  or  idiosyncratic  shocks.  United  States  was  considered  to  be  a 
benchmark fulfilling most, if not all, these requirements. 
By contrast, in the EU and in the EA, labour mobility is very low, due to high language and 
cultural barriers among its member states, financial and banking integration is also low, 
prices and wages tend to be sticky and the EU budget is only 1.1 per cent of the EU GDP, 
versus 25  per cent in  the US  (de la  Dehesa and  Krugman, 1992).  Labour  mobility has 
increased with the recent wave of immigration from third countries but those who move 
freely  within  Schengen  members  states  unfortunately  are  mainly  irregular  immigrants, 
given that legal immigrants have to work for 4 years in a member state to be able to move 
to another one.
Now,  the EA  faces two  important challenges after  suffering the  hardest  recession  in its 
short history (as well as the EU in its long history) which is showing more than ever its 
suboptimal character: 
On the one side, today most member states of the EA are being subject to an excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) for being much above the 3 per cent of GDP and nearly all of them 
have  a  public  debt  to  GDP  ratio  above  60  per  cent  set  as  maxima  by  the  SGP.  Those 
member states with the weaker tax revenue base and tax collection systems and with the 
higher relative government expenditure are suffering high and rising spreads in their debt 
issuance  versus  the  German  Bund  which  acts  as  the  benchmark.  Therefore,  financial 
markets are now forced to apply to those member states the necessary discipline that the 
SGP procedures have not been able to impose before. The SPG started to lose credibility 
when some years ago Germany and France managed to interrupt the rules of the excessive 
deficit procedure and bought themselves some time (Verdun, 2010).Guillermo de la Dehesa– Fiscal and competitive tensions within the euro area
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On  the  other  side,  relative  competitiveness  divergence  among  EA  member  states  has 
reached  a  historical  record.  One  the  one  side,  member  states  with  the  higher  relative 
inflation  rates  and  collective  bargaining  systems  based  on  inflation  (instead  of  on 
productivity), have lost competitiveness. On the other side, large exporter member states 
have reduced their cost of labour by reducing social security contributions by employers 
and by raising VAT, that is, have been engaging in “beggar my neighbour” policies within 
the EA, that is, by making their exports cheaper and their imports more expensive within 
the EA. 
Thus, member states which have lost competitiveness relative to the best to performers are 
now forced to make an internal real devaluation, by forcing their prices, margins and wages 
to grow below the EA average for some years and forcing their productivity to grow above 
the  EA  average  for  several  years,  in  order  to  regain  their  previous  levels  of 
competitiveness, which is also very hard to implement from a political point of view. Both 
problems  are  interlinked, the larger  the  competitiveness loss the  harder  to  achieve the 
fiscal requirement levels imposed by the SGP and vice-versa.
Therefore, as it is happening right now, if the SGP is not applied effectively enough to avoid 
reaching these asymmetrical public finance tensions within the EA, if competitiveness is not 
enhanced  by  some  member states  and  if  there  is  no central  budget  capable  of  helping 
those  member  states  with  serious  fiscal problems in  the  hard  process  of reducing their 
budget deficits and debt levels, then the EA and the euro could be at stake, which could 
undermine 52 years of successful EU economic and monetary integration. 
The  present  EA  governance set-up to  address  these  serious  problems  is  the  following:  
First, there is in the EU Treaty a no bail-out clause (article 103) which stipulates explicitly 
that  neither  the  Community  nor  any  member  state  is  liable  for  or  can  assume  the 
commitments  of  any  other  member  state.  Second,  the  EU  Commission  has  neither  the 
expertise nor the funds to help Greece and less so other member states which could also 
need  them,  as  shown  by  Pisani-Ferry  and  Sapir  (2010).  Third,  the  ECB  could  help 
temporarily  with  liquidity p rovision  but  even  if  it  did,  which  is  very  doubtful,  it  cannot 
impose any conditionality unless it decides to disqualify Greek public debt for its monetary 
policy  operations,  which  is  also  very  doubtful,  and  definitely,  it  cannot  try  to  bail-out 
Greece because it is forbidden by the no bail-out clause of article 103 of the Treaty. Several 
members of the ECB Governing Council have confirmed, on February 2010, that the ECB 
will not help Greece because of the existence of the no bail-out clause. Nevertheless, as 
Schwartzer (2009) has shown, it is one thing to implement a bail-out and another very 
different thing to provide temporary financial assistance.  
As the EA and EU member states keep opposing any increase of the EU budget, national 
treasuries  are  now t he  only  ones  capable  to  help  Greece  directly,  under  strong 
conditionality, and capable to later help other member states which could have solvency 
problems as well. But national taxpayers oppose such help because they say that they are 
now forced to paying for the profligate conduct of other member states which have been 
living beyond their means and eventually producing a serious problem of moral hazard for 
the  rest  of  the  EA.  (For  instance,  70  per  cent  of  German  voters  were  opposed  to  use 
taxpayer  funds t o  bail-out  countries  in  financial  difficulties  such  as  Ireland  or  Greece). 
Financial markets are aware of the inability of the EU and the EA to deal with and solve this 
situation  and  thus  are  requiring  a  larger  risk  premium  from the  debt  issuance  of  the 
members states affected, which makes it for them even more difficult to achieve their fiscal 
consolidation programs required by the SGP.Guillermo de la Dehesa– Fiscal and competitive tensions within the euro area
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Is there any way to improve the present situation? There are several options some can be 
executed in the short term and others in the medium to long term as shown by Schwartzer 
and Dullien (2010):
1) A non starter option is just to let Greece to default as some economists have proposed 
on  the  basis that there is  a  no  bail-out  clause  in  the Treaty  and  that  a  bail-out  would 
increase even more the moral hazard already built in the construction of the EA as pointed 
by Feldstein (2010 and Issing, (2010)).  But letting Greece default  would  put produce a 
large  contagion  effect  on  other  member  states  and  finally  put  the  EA  and  the e uro  at 
serious risks and give a very bad reputation to European integration in general and to the 
EA  in  particular.  Moreover,  this  option  would  not  solve  the  competitiveness  problem  of 
Greece if it stays in the EA and if it leaves the depreciation of its currency will be huge, 
producing very serious social and political upheaval.     
2) The easier and clearer option is to allow the IMF to perform its duties and help Greece or 
any other EA member state which may suffer solvency problems through a program with 
due  conditionality.  The  IMF  has  the  mandate,  the  knowledge,  the  experience  and  the 
resources to do it, even more so after the G20 decision in 2009 approving a large increase 
of resources and DEG issuance for the IMF to lend up to an additional 750 billion US dollars. 
As a matter of fact, the IMF has helped several EU member states like Poland and Hungary 
in 2009 and is now helping Latvia. This option has two sub-options. The first one is that 
Greece decides to call the IMF for help without agreeing it with the EA member states. This 
option would be a big mistake. The second one is that the IMF and the authorities of the EU 
and the EA decide that the IMF should also be involved in the rescue and conditionality of 
Greece working together and adding resources to the EA package.
Unfortunately, there seems to be some unwarranted rejection by the EA and the Eurogroup 
of any IMF involvement in Greece or any other EA member state, when previously the IMF 
was involved in helping both the UK and Italy in 1977, Spain in 1978, and Portugal in 1983 
and now, the economic situation of some members states is similar to the one experienced 
three decades ago.
Nevertheless, the fact that the IMF experts have been allowed to get involved in checking 
Greece economic statistics and its real fiscal situation in order to evaluate the size of its 
necessary fiscal retrenchment maybe a good sign in terms of the probability of it getting 
involved eventually together with the EU and some member states of the EA in an IMF 
program.  The  IMF  then  could  work  together  with those  EA  member  states  willing  to 
participate and  most probably with  the European Investment Bank (EIB), in solving the 
problem posed by Greece which would be the most efficient way to do it and also it would 
add experience in case any other EA member state would later suffer from the same level 
of fiscal unbalance. 
A joint rescue package by the EA and the IMF is much better option than an EA bilateral 
conditional package. On its own with such a problematic package, the EA runs the risk of 
failure given that it has not enough experience and independent resources to accomplish a 
successful outcome. Also, it would be very difficult for the  Member States offering financial 
resources to convince their voters and taxpayers to do so unless they impose extremely 
hard conditions which they would demand Greece to accept. Therefore a joint effort EA-IMF 
would be the best available option in the short term, until the EU and EA finally decide to 
create a  more sophisticated and reliable  system of funding and conditionality for future 
cases  that  solves  the  moral  hazard  issue  within  the  EA  and  improves  the  stringent 
application of the SGP.   Guillermo de la Dehesa– Fiscal and competitive tensions within the euro area
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3) Another option which should be part of this second stage for finding a definitive solution 
is that proposed by Gros and Mayer (2010) as a present alternative to the IMF or the joint 
EA-IMF option by calling for the immediate creation of an IMF by the EU, called Euro(pean) 
Monetary Fund (EMF).  They think that the IMF can do very little if the country in question 
just does not live up to its promises, except withhold further funding and moreover, calling 
the IMF would destroy any prospect of a common EA representation in the IMF and in the 
international institutions in general and,  as  the  IMF is d ominated by the US  it could be 
more lenient with some countries like Greece, because it hosts important US bases being a 
member of NATO and available evidence shows that no country with US bases has ever 
been let down (Hale, 2010). They propose as well the creation of an EU orderly resolution 
scheme  to  deal  with  sovereign  default  of  any  member  state  similar  to  the  one  being 
designed for large financial and complex institutions.     
The EMF should be funded eventually by those EA countries which might constitute in the 
future a burden on the other member states given the existence of a principle of solidarity 
among them and the necessity for EA member countries to avoid creating difficulties on to 
other member  states. Therefore they propose that, annually,  1  per cent  of the stock of 
excess public debt above the 60 per cent of GDP (maximum limit established by the SPG) 
would be contributed to the EMF by every member state with debt in excess and the same 
annual 1 per cent of the excess public deficit (above the 3 per cent of GDP set by the SPG) 
should also be used to fund the EMF. 
This  system  of  punishing  excessive  debt  and  deficit  member  countries  would  give clear 
incentives  for member  states to  keep  their fiscal house  in  order  at  all times. Gros  and 
Mayer  provide  also  for  an  orderly  sovereign  bankruptcy  procedure  that  minimises  the 
disruption resulting from a default. According to them, both features would lower the moral 
hazard problem. 
This option could be a solution to the present problems but it will be very long and difficult 
to implement. The main issues with this option are the following:  To create an EMF will 
take a long of time and it would not solve the urgent problem of helping Greece unless they 
think that it should default. If the EMF imposes a tougher conditionality than the IMF then 
member states will call the IMF first. Its funding system is going to be difficult since most 
member states are under an excessive deficit procedure and almost all are exceeding the 
debt  SPG  ceilings.  Finally,  sovereign  member  states  are  not  companies,  they  can  also 
default but they never go bankrupt (because they are sovereign) so that they do not need 
an orderly bankruptcy procedure. Nevertheless, an adequately modified EMF could be part 
of a solution to these issues in the medium term.   
4)  Another  option,  which  is  complementary  to  the  first,  is  to  create  a  single  issuer  of 
eurobonds instead (or even besides) the present 16 issuers member states. This should 
have two important advantages for the sovereign bond investors, a higher liquidity and a 
higher risk diversification. One of the reasons why the German bund is the EU benchmark 
with the lowest spread is, besides having the lowest relative probability of default, to have 
the largest and most liquid market in the EU. The higher is the liquidity the lower is the 
spread, because investors pay a premium for being able to sell and buy every day in deep 
and liquid sovereign debt market. Guillermo de la Dehesa– Fiscal and competitive tensions within the euro area
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By having a single euro bill and bond grouping the 16 present member states bonds, even 
Germany  could  benefit.  The reason  is  that the  size  of the  US  Treasury  bond market  is 
around 6 trillion US dollars and the joint 16 EA bond market would reach around 4 trillion 
(European  billion)  euros,  while  the  present  German  bund  market  size  is  only  1  trillion
euros. By  grouping the 16 issuers, liquidity would  multiply  and average spreads will go 
down without any apparent cost, it is a kind of “free lunch”. 
By  grouping  the  16  bond  markets  into  one  with  the  joint  guaranty  of  the  EA  member 
states,  investor  risk  diversification  will  increase  notably  given  that  default  rates  will  be 
more widespread and thus average spreads will be lower and all member states could end 
up gaining, although those with a lower default probability would gain less than those with 
a higher one. But it would be difficult to find out the net gains of each and, in any case, the 
net transfers from the lower default probability member states will be much lower than the 
costs of them bailing out other member states as it is happening at this moment in time 
with Greece. 
This option can be a substitute for the strong reluctance of most EU and EA member states 
to commit more resources to the EU budget (and maybe to the EMF) and, at the same 
time, will help the euro to become more used by financial markets, not only by central 
banks and get closer to the dollar as an international currency.
The main problem of the single EA eurobond is that it would weaken the financial markets 
discipline on to those member states that do not control enough the relative size of their 
deficits and debts, in terms  of their GDP, through the cycle.  But this problem could be 
solved by introducing stronger discipline and fines by SPG for those countries which get 
into excessive deficits and debts ratios over the cycle, which should be used to fund bail 
outs in case of asymmetric shocks or a potential EMF in the future. That would give more 
credibility to the eurobond in the markets and spreads could be even lower. Finally, the 
issuer of these eurobonds could be  the EU Commission o r the EIB or  a special new EA 
institution.        Guillermo de la Dehesa– Fiscal and competitive tensions within the euro area
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